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ABSTRACT 
Transitional justice as a field of inquiry is a relatively new one. Referring to the range of 
mechanisms used to assist the transition of a state or society from one form of (usually 
repressive) rule to a more democratic order, transitional justice has become the dominant 
language in which the move from war  to peace is discussed in the early 21
st
 century. 
Applying a deconstructive analysis to the question of transitional justice, the paper seeks to 
interrogate the core assumptions that underlie transitional justice literature in relation to the 
relationship between law, politics and justice. As a discourse, transitional justice is replete 
with antinomies or binary oppositions, that of war and peace being the most obvious. 
Therefore the essentially decsontructible structure of differánce already exists within the 
concept. By examining the ways in which legal and political narratives are framed and 
reproduced, the paper seeks to deconstruct the opposition between law and politics on which 
much of the transitional justice literature rests. The article does not purport to provide a 
definitive critical analysis of transitional justice but aims to provoke debate and to prompt 
critical scholars to engage with the themes raised by providing an introductory analysis of 
some of the core features of a field of inquiry which seems ripe for deconstruction. 
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1. Introduction to Transitional Justice 
Transitional justice as a field of inquiry is a relatively new one. Referring to the range of 
mechanisms used to assist the transition of a state or society from one form of (usually 
repressive) rule to a more democratic order, transitional justice has become the dominant 
language in which the move from war  to peace is discussed in the early 21
st
 century (Bell 
2009). From its origins in political science, documenting the efforts of states to deal with the 
crimes of past governments, such as the military dictatorships in Latin America,
 
transitional 
justice has taken on the form of a normative framework for dealing with political 
transformation (IJTJ 2007). Central to this evolution has been a resurgence of the idea of 
international human rights law and belief in the capacity of law to transcend partisan politics 
and therefore mediate social change. The rise of transitional justice has been stellar, but it is a 
field in which theory has failed to keep pace with doctrinal and empirical developments. 
While there has been significant critical engagement with the requirements of transition, 
notably but not exclusively from feminist legal scholars, this critique has focused on the need 
to ensure a more broadly defined and nuanced definition of transitional justice. To date there 
has been remarkably little theorisation of the concept of transitional justice itself and the way 
in which this new concept has shaped the way in which we think about law and politics.   
Applying a deconstructive analysis to the question of transitional justice, the paper seeks to 
interrogate the core assumptions that underlie transitional justice literature in relation to the 
relationship between law, politics and justice. A number of features of transitional justice 
lend themselves particularly well to deconstructive analysis. As a discourse, transitional 
justice is replete with antinomies or binary oppositions. The most obvious of these are those 
of war and peace, and also that of peace and justice which characterised early transitional 
justice debates. However also included within the discourse are the oppositions between 
democratic and non- democratic, and repressive and transformed, with the distinction 
between good and evil that this implies. Similarly operating is the distinction between victim 
and perpetrator that shapes the boundaries of political inclusion and exclusion in transitional 
contexts. Opposition therefore goes to the very heart of transitional justice discourse and is 
the foundation upon which theorising has occurred. Therefore the essentially decsontructible 
structure of differánce already exists within the concept of transitional justice. It is not then 
surprising that research and advocacy in the field has also tended to rest on binary divisions, 
for example between procedural and substantive models of law, and the distinction between 
law and politics per se. However rather than problematising or interrogating these 
dichotomies, transitional justice scholars to date have tended to speak of law as a means of 
moving from one to the other. The assumption that appears to underlie much of the 
theorisation of the role of law in transition is that it is necessary to move from one to the 
other- from war to peace, for example, or from partisan politics to the rule of law.  Also 
contained within this is an implicit assumption that the move from one to the other is 
teleologically determined progress (Teitel 2003).  By examining the ways in which legal and 
political narratives are framed and reproduced, the paper seeks to deconstruct the opposition 
between law and politics on which much of the transitional justice literature rests. The article 
does not purport to provide a definitive critical analysis of transitional justice. Any one of the 
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themes raised in the article could be the subject of conferences, research papers and books. 
Rather it aims to provoke debate and to prompt critical scholars to engage with the themes 
raised by providing an introductory analysis of some of the core features of a field of inquiry 
which seems ripe for deconstruction. 
The article is structured around three key moments in the development of transitional justice: 
the foundation of the disciplinary space; its constitutive exclusions; and the return of that 
which is excluded (Beardsworth 1996).  
Section one will explore some of the central features of transitional justice. It will do this by 
examining it through the lens of transitional justice as a performative force which has shaped 
the boundaries of how we think about question of justice in the aftermath of conflict. It will 
consider the way in which transitional justice engages questions of violence, law and politics 
in transitional contexts and the idea that law can be regarded as playing a role that is distinct 
from that of politics.  
Section two seeks to interrogate the underlying assumptions on which the discourse of 
transitional justice is founded, exploring the idea that law is the means by which justice in 
transition can be achieved. It will focus in particular on the way in which the boundaries of 
transitional justice are shaped by the juxtaposition of law with politics and the role that law 
plays in ensuring the ongoing preservation of the disciplinary space.  
Section three will focus in more detail on the concept of justice in transition. It will examine 
some of the divergent priorities of transitional justice and consider these combine to shape an 
overarching narrative of justice in transition. It will examine the relationship between law and 
justice that is presented in the transitional justice literature, drawing on the work of Derrida to 
question the extent to which law is capable of delivering justice. In particular section three 
will ask whether the exclusionary structure of law itself means that justice is irreducible to 
law in transitional societies. It will do this in the context of the imposition of regulative ideals 
and the translation of transcendental ideas into empirical reality. Deconstructive analysis 
should reveal both the possibilities as well as the dangers of relying on law as a means of 
achieving justice in transition. For while it is clear that Derrida regards law as necessary, and 
as a means of pursuing justice, it is equally clear that law cannot in and of itself achieve 
justice (Derrida 1992). Therefore a balance must be struck when attempting to achieve justice 
through law. On the one hand law can provide a framework for the pursuit of justice, but on 
the other it should not be regarded as the same thing as justice. 
 
2. The Performative Force of Transitional Justice 
 
a. The emergence of practice 
Transitional justice as a concept was unheard of in international law prior to the end of the 
Cold War. While retrospective claims are often made about the genesis of transitional justice 
in the trials at Nuremberg, the term itself was not applied until the 1990s (Arthur 2009) 
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Efforts at achieving what is now termed transitional justice during the 1970’s and 1980s had 
been subject to political wrangling, subject to whatever concession on human rights could be 
secured politically rather than rooted in a normative (let alone international) obligation to 
pursue a particular course of action (Teitel 2003). Work in the field in the early years 
consisted primarily of the documentation of efforts that were already being made by states to 
deal with abusive governments. Dancy describes this phase as the “cataloguing of those 
structural realities within political transitions that harness the possibilities for victims’ 
justice” (Dancy 2010, p 356). With the end of the Cold War and the apparent triumph of 
liberalism, a new found confidence allowed normative conclusions to be draw from this 
documentary work, and those conclusions to be drawn internationally as a means for dealing 
with past human rights abuse (Orentlicher 1991).  
Although operating within distinct legal and political frameworks at the time, each of the 
regimes of post conflict reconstruction, human rights and international criminal law 
contributed to the emergence of an overarching conceptual field of transitional justice 
(McEvoy 2007)- one which sought to reconcile the key aims of each of these disciplines or 
endeavours within a coherent conceptual framework. It is in this immediate post Cold War 
period that a distinctive normative concept begins to emerge, resting on the twin pillars of 
providing justice for victims of human rights abuse while also supporting the emergence of 
democracy. Arthur, in her conceptual history of the field, suggests that those who were 
involved in debates at the time regarded the project as offering an intellectual framework that 
was previously absent for discussing issues that were raised in postwar societies such as 
Germany, Spain, Greece and Argentina (Arthur 2009, p 327). It was in this period, however, 
that law and legalism began to colonise the field. Transitional justice was initially narrowly 
defined, dealing solely with judicial responses to human rights abuse and operating alongside 
other regimes of post conflict reconstruction, such as state building and democratisation that 
operated in a less legal and more politically oriented framework. Transitional justice emerged 
as an international criminal law response to human rights abuse, entailing a strict 
understanding of “justice” as “criminal justice”. Transitional “justice”, in the form of 
prosecution for past human rights abuse, was simply one among many divergent tools that 
could be used to move a state from conflict to peace, as evidenced in the separate frameworks 
for action. Gradually, however, the scope of transitional justice expanded. Criminal 
prosecutions came to be seen as a means to address more broadly defined ideas of political 
and social transformation (Akhavan 1998),
  
and the debate centred around the opposition 
between peace and justice. This then moved on to a division between truth and justice, and 
the extent to which truth either represented or denied justice. With each new step the field of 
transitional justice expanded to incorporate a broader range of objectives. The interplay of 
these seemingly oppositional concepts exposed the way in which the boundaries of 
transitional justice were subject to the ongoing and contested interpretation. For example, as 
seemingly peripheral concepts such as truth and reconciliation jostled for position and were 
represented as integral to justice rather than opposed to it, the parameters for inclusion within 
the definition of transitional justice expanded.  In so doing transitional justice also began to 
encompass many of the political elements it had previously worked alongside (Bell 2009; cf 
IJTJ 2007). They became subsumed into a much broader narrative of transition, increasingly 
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regulated by law. This broadened (international) mandate was confirmed  in the 2004 Report 
of the Secretary General on Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in Conflict and Post 
Conflict Societies in which the goals of transitional justice were explicitly linked with those 
of peace and democracy, and in particular with the consolidation of the rule of law. Bell sums 
this development up as follows: 
“The attempt to find and articulate a common legal framework gave rise to a situation where 
particularised relationships between dealing with the past and constitutional settlement ... 
were narrated as part of the one phenomenon of how to account for the past and satisfy 
international standards.” (Bell 2009, p 16). 
This was all done within the framework of increased emphasis on rule of law responses to 
conflict, increasingly through the implementation of international law standards (UN 2004 & 
2011).Adopting a more broadly defined purpose and modus operandi was central to the 
evolution of the concept, which is in large part defined by this mandate of achieving peaceful 
and lasting change in transitional societies. The centrality of this mandate can be seen clearly 
in the theorisation of the concept of transitional justice.  
b. Theorisation of the model 
In 2000 Ruti Teitel published her seminal text Transitional Justice, in which she outlined 
what she saw as an emerging conception of the field and its core underlying assumptions. 
This text is chosen as illustrative of thinking in the field at the time. Teitel brings together 
discussion of previously disparate mechanisms for dealing with the past, including trials, 
truth commissions, lustration and constitutional reform, each of which had their own distinct 
aims and objectives, and discusses them within the new conceptual framework of transitional 
justice. A significant focus of this inquiry is the role that law can play in facilitating political 
transition. From the year 2000 transitional justice, it has been argued, has existed as a “self 
conscious field of practice and study...” (Bell 2009, p 8) the label used to denote a general 
conception of justice in political transition characterised by legal responses to past injustice 
(Teitel 2000). In particular the shift that occurred at this time was one from viewing justice 
that operated alongside other political mechanisms in transition, to transitional justice as 
necessary to deliver successful transitions – peace through justice. In particular, Teitel’s 
conceptualisation of the field highlights the shift in understandings of the role of law in post 
conflict situations, moving away from existing and clearly defined regimes of legality to one 
which is more contingent and shaped by the circumstances in which it operates. The re-
conception of law as fluid and capable of providing a framework for transformation laid the 
foundations for the domination of the field by law.  Once the traditional rigidity of law and 
legal process had been stripped away almost any reform or transformative initiative could be 
justified using the mantle of law.   From the turn of the century what has emerged is a new 
juridical concept of transitional justice. The emergence of this concept represents a 
performative event of considerable force in international law.  The effect of this performative 
event has been the delimitation of a “theatrical space” within which all efforts at peace 
making must play out (Derrida 2001, p 29). The effect of this performative force is not 
limited to the evolution of the academic discourse of transitional justice. In very practical 
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terms the conceptualisation of transitional justice as a distinct field of endeavour has 
profoundly influenced the way in which it has developed in practice. The two are therefore 
integrally linked. 
The emergence of a theorised concept of transitional justice represented the constitution of a 
new field, a new way of constructing meaning in relation to justice. Once a normative 
element was established in transitional justice literature, all efforts at peacemaking became 
subject to evaluation according to the requirements of that framework itself. This was clearly 
evident in respect of the belief in the rule of law inherent in transitional justice thinking. This 
new international order facilitated the emergence of new normative frameworks for action 
and evaluation (see generally Bell 2006). Despite the existence of a complex web of 
interrelated claims to the genesis and aims of transitional justice, an overarching narrative 
emerged dominant, evidenced in a convergence of opinion that certain unifying principles of 
justice in transition exist and that these normative principles are embodied in mechanisms 
such as trials, truth commissions and reparations (Subotic 2012, p 120). Transitional justice 
initiatives could be evaluated on the extent to which they delivered “justice” as defined in 
international law and action in transitional contexts came to be legitimated by the label of 
transitional justice. In this way the emergence of the model of transitional justice can be seen 
as a performative event – a coup de force or rupture with the preceding order (Derrida 1992). 
The coup de force was one in which the role of politics which had been the dominant force 
both nationally and internationally, was usurped by that of law. The way in which this force 
was legitimised, however, was the promise of a new beginning, that the new model of 
transitional justice represented a new system to replace the corrupt or immoral system it 
replaced (Douzinas 2005, p 175). In this way the field of transitional justice holds itself apart 
from earlier (failed) models which are found wanting in terms of their compliance with set 
standards of justice. The new model represents a break from the need to trade justice against 
peace, and promises a future in which peace will be based on justice. The emergence of this 
concept of transitional justice is also intimately linked with the narration of the “end of 
history” whereby the end of ideological conflict created the conditions for a universalised and 
post political language of human rights and international justice (Turner 2011).  
The implications of the performative force of transitional justice remain as yet unclear. 
Derrida himself acknowledges that the force of the emergence of related concepts such as 
“crime against humanity” or even “human rights” can be seen either as “an immense 
progress, an historic transformation” or alternatively as “a concept still obscure in its limits, 
fragile in its foundations”(Derrida 2001, p 30).What is clear, however, is that with the 
emergence of the model of transitional justice came an exclusionary force whereby those who 
seek redress must do so in the language of transitional justice, thus inherently delimiting the 
narration of violence and justice (Nagy 2008, p 276).  The effect of this is homogenising 
(McCormick  2001, p 406). Where one concept or one way of seeing the world is placed at 
the centre of meaning and prioritised over all other ways of thinking, the effect is to 
marginalise or exclude all other ways of interpreting meaning. The pursuit of the foundational 
concept becomes a quest for absolute truth which can legitimise subsequent action as neutral 
and just. This is characterised by the belief that there is one self evident meaning of justice, 
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and one correct way to pursue it, and alternative approaches are marginalised from debate 
(Fitzpatrick 2005). Transitional justice, despite (or perhaps because of) attempts to introduce 
greater interdisciplinarity into the field (Bell 2009), remains a resolutely legal field, resting 
on a number of core assumptions surrounding the capacity of law to mediate social change. 
 
3. Setting the Boundaries –Transitional Justice and the Role of Law 
As outlined, the unifying feature of transitional justice has become the idea that law can be a 
means to achieve justice. The promotion of the rule of law through international human rights 
norms underpins the entire discourse of transitional justice. It is therefore worth explaining in 
more detail how the role of law is characterised in transitional justice and how law is viewed 
as responding to the particular circumstances of post conflict societies. 
Transitional justice rests on the paradox that it seeks to address past failings of the law by 
replacing it with law.  While transitional justice may operate in contexts where law and order 
has irreparably broken down, in many conflicted societies what is at issue is not the existence 
of the law but rather its legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Legitimacy may be 
contested, with ongoing struggle for “ownership” of the law, leaving debates polarised 
between those who seek to maintain the continuity of law and those who reject the legality of 
the existing law and demand reform or overthrow of the system (Turner 2010). To try and 
mediate this dispute, the role of law (and indeed the rule of law) in transition has been vested 
with particular meaning whereby the stability and continuity of the “rule of law” is 
maintained, but the substance of the law is re-envisaged as a substantive model that 
encompasses clearly defined principles of justice. As Teitel states, the role of law in 
transitional contexts is to “mediate the normative shift in values that characterises these 
extraordinary periods.” (Teitel 2000, p 11). Law in transition is constructed in relation to the 
nature of the injustice of the previous regime, deemed to be illegitimate and discredited. This, 
according to Teitel, provides legitimacy for legal change. What is being advanced, therefore, 
is not only a shift in understanding of the politics of law in the transitional phase, but also a 
fundamental shift in understandings of the role and function of law itself. One of the core and 
accepted premises of transitional justice is that the role of law in transition is fundamentally 
different from that in ordinary or settled regimes. The operation of law in transition speaks 
directly to the idea that there is a need to move from one form of society to another, thus 
responding to the history and narrative of conflict and therefore law. Teitel highlighted three 
key features of law in transition. These were that law was socially constructed; that 
international law could transcend domestic legal understandings; and finally that the rule of 
law could transcend politics. 
a. Law and the Model of Transition 
The concept of transitional justice emerged as an overarching conceptual framework for 
negotiating the move from war, conflict or repression, to a more peaceful society. However 
as discussed above, the emergence of concept of transition, and consequently of transitional 
justice, represents a moment of performative force, a moment at which new boundaries are 
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imposed on the meaning of political reform. Once this moment of performative force has 
occurred, the new concept comes to legitimise all subsequent meaning invested in the 
concept. However to maintain this, an ongoing act of interpretation is required. In practical 
terms this means that transitional mechanisms are evaluated within the new parameters of 
transitional justice, but in conceptual terms it means that the necessity for these mechanisms 
and reforms must also be interpreted in light of the concept. This ongoing process of 
interpretation represents a constative force whereby the force of the establishment of the 
concept itself is constantly re-affirmed through these processes of interpretation (Derrida 
1992). It is therefore necessary for the discourse of transitional justice to be justified with 
reference to the boundaries of meaning established by the origin of the field. Once a concept 
has been established, once the field had been constituted, the concept assumes legal form of 
its own. To survive and establish its own authority it must become independent of its history, 
must assume institutional form in its own right (Derrida 2002, p 47-48).  This means that 
although the force of the origin remains inscribed within the concept itself, the 
implementation of the new law is re-interpreted as a necessity, as a demand of legality 
(Douzinas 2005, p 175). This process of interpretation at once conceals and perpetuates the 
originary force with which the concept was constituted, thus revealing the “differential 
contamination” between performative force and its preservation (Derrida 1992, p 42). In 
seeking to deconstruct the relationship between the foundation of law and its ongoing 
authority, Derrida suggests that there can be no rigorous separation of these two types of 
force, but rather that the story of the origin of the law will be continually repeated in order to 
reinforce the legitimacy of the law.
 
The way in which the performative force is maintained is 
clearly visible in the way in which the role of law in transition has been conceptualised by 
scholars of transitional justice, and in particular how the role of law has been framed to 
maintain the distinctness of transitional justice.  
Central to transitional justice is the idea of a shift from one illegitimate form of government 
to a more democratic order. Fundamentally, it is assumed that there is a gap between the “law 
as written” and “law as perceived”- the legitimacy of the law depends on popular 
understandings of legality. This gap between law and popular perceptions give rise to many 
of the key antinomies of transitional justice (Campbell & Ní Aoláin 2005). Of particular note 
are the distinctions between the “is” and the “ought” of law, and between procedural and 
substantive democracy. These are held out as the key points of tensions in repressive or 
conflicted societies, the points around which conflict over the legitimacy of law is most likely 
to arise. These distinctions are also integral to the raison d’etre of transitional justice in that it 
is precisely these gaps that transitional justice aims to close, using legal form itself to move 
from one form of legality to another.  This is not an altogether uncontroversial claim from a 
legal point of view. All instances of transitional justice will give rise to conflict over the 
desirability of maintaining legal certainty as opposed to justifying a new and distinctive 
conception of law forged in response to an existing set of circumstances, one clearly rooted in 
history and narrativity. To try and obviate some of this criticism, transitional justice theorists 
have sought to shift the locus of legal legitimacy from the domestic order to the international, 
looking particularly to international human rights law as a standard external to the parties 
which can provide guidance on the necessary course of action (Bell et al 2004, p 306). 
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International human rights law is regarded as a means of bridging the gap in understandings 
of the role and function of law in transition. Whereas the antinomies of positive and natural 
law, and procedural and substantive law present dilemmas for the domestic law theorist, 
Teitel suggests that international law can successfully mediate this tension. She states; 
“grounded in positive law but incorporating values of justice associated with natural law, 
international law mediates the rule of law dilemma.”(Teitel 2000, p 21).  This emphasis on 
the incorporation of the values of justice into the substance of law both highlights the link 
being made in transitional justice between law and justice, but also the fundamental shift 
from established notions of legality. Where the legality, rather than the existence, of the law 
is called into question, the new regime speaks directly to the experience of injustice or 
repression, implicitly acknowledging the failure of law in the past. The role of international 
law is simply to ease the passage of this new vision of legality, providing as it does 
independent standards against which the action can be judged (Bell et al 2004, p 308). The 
importance of incorporating international law, and with it values of justice, in a transitional 
context is also reflected in Teitel’s third understanding of the role of law in transition – that it 
is capable of transcending the passing politics of the time. This understanding goes to the 
heart of transitional justice, and in particular the use of law to achieve transitional outcomes. 
“Rule of Law” is viewed as a means of simultaneously preserving the continuity of legal 
form yet marking a break from the old regime and enabling normative change. Although 
critical of the turn to legalism, McEvoy succinctly outlines what he terms the “seductive 
qualities of legalistic analysis”. He states 
“Claims that the rule of law speaks to values and working practices such as justice, 
objectivity, uniformity, rationality etc are particularly prized in times of profound social and 
political transition.” (McEvoy 2007, p 417) 
Although Teitel and others acknowledge the politically contingent nature of law in transition, 
most agree that law fulfils an important symbolic function in such contexts. Campbell and Ní 
Aoláin see law in transition as providing the means to confront human rights abuses through 
the application of legal procedure to narrative forums, and providing a “safe and stable” 
means to assist the journey (Campbell & Ní Aoláin 2005, p 188).
 
The conception of law in 
the transitional justice literature is also regarded as a key source of democratic legitimacy. 
Rather than being held hostage to politics, the application of legal form is seen as a means of 
transcending existing political conflict and allowing a society to move towards a new form of 
governance, shielded by the formality of law and legal procedure. The rule of law is 
represented as providing a new site of contestation, bounded by legality. 
In this way the interpretation of the role of law in transition ensures the ongoing constitution 
of the field. Transitional justice, as outlined, above, emerged in attempts to deliver legal 
accountability at times of political change. It is therefore foreseeable that the field should be 
concerned with maintaining its essence of legal normativity. This is done through the 
juxtaposition of law with politics in transitional contexts. Law is represented as embodying 
values of justice that are absent from politics. It is further portrayed as a necessary means of 
transcending politics and ensuring that just outcomes are achieved. Each time law is 
interpreted or applied in this way the performative force of the concept of transitional justice 
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is repeated. The patterns of inclusion and exclusion inherent in the constitution of the field 
are replicated through the interpretation of some mechanisms as falling legitimately within 
the scope of transitional justice and others as falling outside that scope (for examples of this 
tension see Dugard 1997; Sarkin 2001).  Politics remains the excluded trace which helps to 
define the limits of transitional justice. This contrast with politics helps to provide law in 
transition with its own identity, uniqueness and unity. The boundaries of transitional justice 
are determined by a system of positive laws and conventions which define its character 
(Derrida 1987). It must be clearly visible what is contained within the concept and what 
remains outside. This limitedness provides the basis for the legitimacy, and for the 
acceptance of the idea of transitional justice as a distinct field, as separate from passing 
politics and therefore having the capacity to deliver change (Davies 2001). The legitimacy of 
this new model of transitional justice depends on it being able to distinguish itself from other 
values such as politics and morality. The definition of conceptual boundaries to the field of 
transitional justice opens up the possibility for deconstruction of the field itself. The act of 
naming processes as “transitional justice” serves to further define the boundaries of the field 
(Derrida 1987). Therefore he or she who is vested with the power of decision making also 
exercises the power of definition of the very boundaries of the field itself. The moment of 
decision serves to maintain the structure of the institution. This raises significant questions 
over who decides, according to what criteria, the content or narrative of transitional justice? 
Who sets the priorities? And what effect does this have on competing narratives? These 
questions are not just of rhetorical interest. They illustrate practical difficulties with 
establishing a normative regime such as transitional justice which has the power to define and 
shape processes of social reform.  
b. Law and “Non Paradigmatic” Transitions 
Analysis of transitions dominated by dichotomy heavily influenced the constitution of the 
field and the model of transitional justice that emerged. Early transitions represented 
“paradigmatic” transitions – those punctuated by the antinomies of war and peace; 
democratic and non-democratic (Campbell & Ní Aoláin 2005, p 182-184). Teitel’s 
conception of transitional justice in particular assumes that one can reasonably easily 
distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of law, for example, or repressive versus 
transformed societies. The rise of non-paradigmatic transitions has presented new challenges 
in terms of the scope and definition of the field. 
By the end of the twentieth century the nature of the situations to which the label of 
“transition” was being applied had altered significantly. Rather than dealing with inter state 
conflict or military dictatorship, the majority of transitional justice activity was arising as a 
result of negotiated peace settlements (Bell 2000). The end of a conflict by negotiated 
agreement meant there were no clear winners or losers. Peace agreements rarely spell out 
precise transitional requirements, therefore while an agreement can serve as a means of 
bringing transitional justice on to the agenda, fundamental disagreement can remain over its 
scope and definition. The power of the label of transitional justice can lead to struggle over 
ownership of the concept itself and conflict over the scope, definition and priority to be 
afforded to transitional mechanisms (Turner 2010). Take for instance the example of 
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Northern Ireland. Since the signing of the Belfast (or “Good Friday”) Agreement in 1998 
Northern Ireland has undergone wide ranging legal reforms aimed at redressing past failures 
of law. It is common to speak of Northern Ireland as being in transition (Campbell et al. 
2003), and yet there remains a distinct tension over the application of the label of transitional 
justice and the underlying rationale for human rights reforms (Turner 2010). Well 
documented, for example, is the perception that demands for dealing with the past are simply 
part of a broader Republican agenda to discredit the state and re-write the narrative of the 
conflict (Rolston 2006; Simpson 2009).  
The model of transitional justice assumes a rupture with a prior regime which is held to be 
discredited on account of breach with public support and perceptions of legality. It also 
assumes that this moment of rupture, most often the physical manifestation of conflict, can be 
isolated from political and social dynamics that have preceded it and be addressed as an 
exceptional event rather than part of ongoing contestation of norms. In these contexts the 
very definition of transitional justice can make certain courses of action controversial. In 
particular the idea that transitional justice requires acknowledgement of past failures can be 
problematic. Transitional justice itself rests on what Derrida terms “semantic instability” 
(Derrida 2003, p 105). The application of the label of transitional justice will make an 
inherent value judgement, make pronouncement on the origins and sustenance of the conflict 
(Bell 2009; Campbell & Ní Aoláin 2005). In this regard the concept of transitional justice 
itself is revealed as an external force which is brought to bear on post conflict societies. 
Within this relationship of force Derrida describes how the dominant power is the one that 
manages to impose and thus legitimate (indeed legalise) on a national or world stage, the 
terminology, and thus interpretation that best suits it in a given situation (Derrida 2003, p 
105). Thus, rather than maintaining a presence that is independent of politics or morality, the 
distinction between the legal field of transitional justice and the politics that it aims to 
transcend is revealed to be an illusion. Far from existing independently from history, politics 
and morality, transitional justice bears within it traces of all of these influences. This can be 
seen in the use of the terms “acknowledgement” and “denial” – the assumption being that 
acknowledgement is a necessary component of transitional justice (see generally Derrida 
2001). The implicit demand is that one side concede their story, their experience of the 
conflict and their narrative must give way to that of the other side. Where there are contested 
narratives of the conflict at play this demand for acknowledgement is not a value free 
assumption. Applying the label of transitional justice allows one side to take control of the 
direction of reform in a way that simply replicates the politics and the violence of open 
conflict. Yet the interpretation of the concept of transitional justice in a way which seeks to 
apply ostensibly neutral legal principles to mediate reform serves to replicate patterns of 
inclusion and exclusion on a micro level (Simpson 2007). Adopting one narrative of conflict 
over another and favouring it through the application of the rhetoric of transition simply 
represents the maintenance of the original performative force through the process of 
interpretation. 
These three understandings of the rule of law in transition demonstrate the way in which law 
is regarded both as a means to deliver justice for past human rights abuses, and also deliver 
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sustainable political reform in conflicted societies. Law under this conception has a role to 
play in telling the story of the conflict, in forging narratives of right and wrong and in 
responding to those charges. The application of legal form is in and of itself regarded as 
assisting with the establishment of democratic legitimacy and providing a mediated 
framework for political conflict. 
  
4. Transitional Justice and the Regulative Ideal 
Knowledge in transitional justice is constructed around the core of a particular conception of 
justice – that of the application of human rights law to respond to past human rights abuse. 
This can have a backward looking element, in terms of delivering justice for victims, 
embodied in mechanisms such as trials and truth commissions, but it also contains a forward 
looking element where justice is deemed to consist of the application of human rights law in a 
way which marks a break from a repressive or abusive past and ensures justice in the future, 
through for example processes of constitutional reform. From either perspective the 
interpretation of justice that emerges from the transitional justice literature is legal justice. 
Justice in transition remains determined by legal rules and standards.  
In addition to this characterisation of the role of law in transition, however, is the way in 
which transitional justice as a field (or as a concept) has been characterised. Transitional 
justice mechanisms are represented as the necessary means of achieving or concretising the 
abstract concept of justice. In this way transitional justice mirrors a Kantian vision of 
ethically determined action whereby principles of law and political action can be deduced 
from transcendental standards. This vision of law is evident in Teitel’s claim that 
international law incorporates standards of justice associated with natural law.  Thus “good” 
law serves as the bridge between the realms of natural justice and positive law. Derrida notes 
that it is a common presupposition of both natural and positive lawyers that just ends can be 
achieved by just means (Derrida 1992, p 32).  Purportedly natural law principles are 
transformed into juridical ones, prescribing rules and setting limits on political action. Central 
to this vision is the assumption that what ought to be done can be done, and that there is an 
identifiable means of achieving the demands of ethical action (La Caz 2007). This idea of 
“good” law that can be deduced from the transcendental realm displaces law from the social 
to the natural realm (Newman 2001, p 17). Rights are viewed as essential, founded in natural 
law and therefore having an existence that can be determined independently from history or 
genesis. Law should be universal – applicable to each individual as if it were a universal law 
of nature. This transcendental concept of right mediates the relationship between law and 
politics and becomes the foundation and legitimating concept for the construction of 
knowledge in respect of right. In this context there is little or no questioning of the right of 
law (Derrida 1992, p 34). In the case of transitional justice the concept of right takes the form 
of justice. Following a Kantian logic, there is a standard of justice that can be deduced from 
transcendental principles and this is translated through law (most notably human rights law). 
The idea of justice becomes a fixed regulatory ideal, a means of determining action (for a 
critique of fixed regulatory ideals in this context see Derrida 2003). 
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This idea of a regulatory idea, or rules that can and ought to determine action, speaks directly 
to the conception of law in transition. Law in transition is represented as marking a 
fundamental shift from notions of legality, translating transcendental principles into law and 
providing a more responsive model of law that speaks directly to justice (Teitel 2000, p21). 
In this way the relationship between ethics (or right) and politics is mediated by law, 
represented as being based on neutral and impartial principles. Law, following this logic, can 
therefore legitimately regulate politics. To this extent the form or structure of law (the law of 
law) is significant. Law is portrayed as having its own unique identity separate to politics and 
morality. It is this that vests it with its authority and allows it to mediate this divide between 
transcendental ethical principles and empirical political action. For example, the reduction of 
human rights to writing increases certainty in what exactly human rights are. In this way the 
transcendental requirements of justice are translated into the empirical reality of law. Rights 
are no longer simply the subject of philosophical speculation, they exist because they are 
posited in internationally ratified instruments. The boundaries of this law are defined by 
criteria established by positive law and convention (Derrida 1987). As a result law should be 
capable of providing justifiable solutions to the problems of transition. Similarly, monitoring 
bodies may engage in interpretation of the precise scope and requirements of posited rights 
(Mechlem 2009). There can be authoritative and legitimate pronouncement on the content of 
the right. This again means that rights are not subject to political horse trading but are rather 
the subject of clearly defined legal obligation. Adjudication can be undertaken on the basis of 
a legally determined rule, independent of political influence. This separation of legal 
arguments from political or moral arguments is regarded as a key means of overcoming 
disagreement (Kingsbury 2002). Where there is a clash or competing conception of right, of 
morality or of justice, that which is enshrined in law will prevail. Where balancing is required 
this can be undertaken within the parameters of law itself, under the doctrine of relative 
indeterminacy. The simple fact of having to balance rights should not undermine the 
objectivity of the law per se. For transitional justice scholars, the rule of law is regarded as 
transcending politics and in particular as fulfilling and important symbolic function. Precisely 
because of the inevitable disagreement over the meaning of justice in transitional societies, 
law steps in to replace politics as the basis for authoritative decisions (Kingsbury 2002). This 
apparent depoliticisation of law is a central feature of transitional justice. In the drive towards 
justice, politics is to be neutralised. Principles of justice are the foundations upon which the 
new state is to be constructed. They are represented as neutral and objective principles 
against which the success of transition can be measured (Turner 2008). In this way justice 
forms an ethical horizon, a pre-determined outcome achieved through the implementation of 
legal rules. However it is with this question of the foundation of the law that cracks begin to 
emerge in this concept of law in transition.  
Transitional societies are defined by political conflict. Where transitional justice mechanisms 
have sought to foster political reconciliation through legal means, this has often been at the 
expense of genuine political engagement. The idea of justice, understood as legal  justice, is 
so securely rooted in the foundations of transitional justice that it leaves no space for the 
ongoing contestation of these concepts of right, law or justice themselves (Sokoloff 2005). In 
transitional contexts the temptation is to maintain stability at all costs, even where this 
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prevents any meaningful engagement with the underlying assumptions of the transitional 
project. Politics is relegated to the sidelines of public life, viewed as a threat to the stability of 
the rule of law (see generally Chandler 2000). The distinction between law and justice 
collapses, and law becomes the dominant means of regulating difference It is the foundation 
and inherent limitations of this vision of law that a deconstructive analysis reveals. 
Deconstruction reveals how law and the discourse of transitional justice, rather than 
transforming violent conflict, conceal violence at their very foundation. 
a. Transitional justice as autoimmunity? 
As outlined, transitional justice aims to be both backward and forward looking. Central to the 
rationale for transitional justice is the idea that it not only responds to past events but that it 
seeks to prevent those events from recurring in the future. Seen in this way transitional justice 
responds to traumatism where the evil comes from the possibility of repetition (Derrida 
2003). Although ostensibly seeking redress for past injustice, transitional justice is equally 
concerned with guarantees of non-recurrence (United Nations 2011). The emphasis placed on 
rule of law underscores the sense of threat posed by failure to deal with past events and 
therefore risk a return to violence. In order to address this threat, transitional justice 
mechanisms such as trials and truth commissions set limits of temporal jurisdiction which 
define the scope of the events to which a response is required. In doing this the discourse 
seeks to isolate a certain set of events and represent them as extraordinary, as something 
which had a beginning and an end and which are somehow separate from normal politics.  
The events under investigation are represented as fleeting, as simply one event in a long 
history that must be dealt with and moved on from. 
In doing this, however, it can be argued that transitional justice itself simply ends up 
reproducing and regenerating patterns of conflict which it seeks to disarm (Derrida 2003). 
This is seen in the way in which law is relied upon as the means of achieving justice, in 
particular the way in which the boundaries of the concept of transitional justice are defined to 
exclude not only alternative mechanisms for dealing with political conflict, but also to silence 
dissenting voices that do not fit neatly into the narrative of transition. Inclusion and exclusion 
from the new political regime is shaped by the narrative of transition and the extent to which 
groups and individuals are willing or able to articulate their positions in the language of 
transitional justice. In the quest to immunise against recurrence, transitional justice adopts 
rigid structures which may ultimately work to destroy that immunity. The desire to achieve 
closure on past events, to reach a solution in the present that will safeguard the future places 
boundaries or limits on the possibility of justice. 
b. Law is not the same as justice 
The pursuit of human rights in transition tends towards the equation of law, and the 
implementation of international human rights law, with justice. This is evidenced most 
clearly in the drive towards legal mechanisms for responding to trauma. International 
blueprints provide frameworks for justice that reduced the singular to the general- that 
impose generalised rules, norms and universalised imperatives on societies “in transition”. 
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The originary concept of transitional justice provides a determinate existence – a solid 
foundation –for the system of meaning, and for the interpretation of “justice”. The 
assumption that underlies this model of transitional justice is that the application of rules and 
programmes for action is a means of achieving justice.  When seen through a deconstructive 
lens, the effect of this, while seeking to achieve the impossible – seeking to achieve justice -  
is simply to deliver the possible in its place (De Ville 2008, p 105). What this means is that in 
the effort to enshrine principles of justice into the originary act of founding a law (the terms 
of reference for a tribunal or truth commission, or the drafting of a constitution, for example), 
a regulatory horizon of expectation is imposed In this act the essence of justice is lost. The 
imposition of calculated rules buries the possibility of justice (Derrida 1992). Once the 
outcome of law becomes fixed and determinate the responsiveness that allows law to pursue 
justice is lost. This is not to suggest that there should be no normative orientation to 
transitional justice. Rather what is central is the ability to recognise the potentially coercive 
effects of the determinate element of law. Relying too heavily, or without question, on law 
and the inviolability of law, can deny the responsiveness of law and reduce it to an ultimately 
arbitrary standard. Where law, or any other determinate concept, comes to be regarded as 
fixed and inviolate, the risk is that the centrality of this concept ceases to be subjected to 
scrutiny (Sokoloff, 2005). The ongoing process of questioning that Derrida advocates as 
necessary in order to achieve justice is lost, and with it the ability of law to deliver 
meaningful change. As Fitzpatrick states, “’In God We Trust’ can relieve us of trusting each 
other” (Fitzpatrick 2005). The unquestioning acceptance of norms and systems becomes not 
only possible but commonplace. In situations defined by political conflict, by competing 
narratives, placing too great an emphasis on the application of norms also absolves 
responsibility for openness to the other. Where ones position can be reinforced by reference 
to law there is no longer any need to engage with the other. 
As Derrida himself describes, “droit claims to exercise itself in the name of justice and ... 
justice is required to establish itself in the name of a law that must be enforce.”(Derrida 1992, 
p 22). Transitional justice scholars have tended to equate justice with law, or to view justice 
as something that can be achieved through the enforcement of human rights law. However, to 
the extent that justice can be present in law and (reformed) institutions, it is only as a 
possibility (Derrida 1992). It should not be treated as an identifiable end point such as a 
particular model of democracy or governance, or as the enforcement of legal rights. Justice 
should have no horizon of expectation, regulative or messianic (Derrida 1992, p 27). Justice 
represents a call to a more consequential change “not simply in the naïve sense of calculated, 
deliberate and strategically controlled intervention, but in the sense of maximum 
intensification of a transformation in progress, in the name of neither a simple symptom nor 
simple cause.” (Derrida 1992, p 9). 
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5. Conclusion : The (Im)possibility of Transitional Justice? 
Derrida himself suggested in Force of Law that it was “foreseeable and desirable that studies 
of deconstructive style should culminate in the problematic of law and justice” (Derrida 1992, 
p 7). It seems equally foreseeable and desirable that studies of transitional justice should 
culminate in deconstruction of the concepts of law and justice on which the field is founded, 
for deconstruction itself is a problematisation of the foundations of law, morality and politics. 
In the preceding sections it has been shown how questions of law, morality and politics are 
intimately linked in the context of transitional justice, to the extent that rigid distinction 
between the concepts themselves can no longer withstand scrutiny. In transitional justice the 
urge must be resisted to look for determinate frameworks of justice. Law, and human rights 
law in particular, should not be instrumentally subordinated to a determined outcome. Law 
must remain open to the possibility of justice. For justice exceeds rules and calculations. It is 
not simply a juridical or a political concept, but it opens up for the future the possibility of 
transformation, of re-casting or re-founding law and politics. The challenge to remain open to 
critical engagement is rooted in the idea of an infinite idea of justice that is irreducible to law. 
It is in this ongoing process of questioning that justice lies – in the openness to the other, the 
existence of whom is immanent to the idea of transition. In this way deconstruction is 
transitional justice. 
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